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Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
Enough is Enough* 
Maurice Rosenberg * * 
Warren R. King*** 
Recent years have witnessed a torrent of criticism of the 
practice of pretrial discovery in federal litigation. The outcry 
was significantly amplified by the Pound Conference, convened 
in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1976. Among the conclusions 
prompted by the Conference was this one: 
There is a very real concern in the legal community that 
the discovery process is now being overused. Wild fishing expe- 
ditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm. Un- 
necessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high 
costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the dis- 
covery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be 
part of some lawyers' trial strategy.' 
In response to this concern, the American Bar Association 
appointed the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery 
Abuse to make recommendations for the control of improper 
discovery practices. In late 1977 the Special Committee ad- 
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vanced a group of proposals for consideration by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States. The Advisory Committee adopted some of the 
proposals and circulated a draft report for public comment.' Af- 
ter hearings and considerable debate, the Advisory Committee 
issued a revised report in February 1979' that dropped several of 
the bar committee's proposals, including restrictions on the per- 
mitted scope of discovery and limitations on the number of in- 
terrogatories a party could serve without a court order. 
In April 1980 the Supreme Court promulgated amendments 
to the federal discovery rules4 which did not include either the 
restrictions on the scope of discovery or the limitations on the 
number of interrogatories. Mr. Justice Powell, joined by two 
other Justices, dissented from the promulgation of the amended 
rules, criticizing as "inadequate" the package that had been 
promulgated and expressing concern that significant reform 
would be delayed for ten years by the "tinkering" changes.' His 
dissent warned that without substantial improvement "the dis- 
covery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to 
bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court 
COS~S."~ 
The 1980 amendments have not quieted the unrest in the 
bar about federal discovery practice. The ABA's Special Com- 
mittee has returned to the fray by advancing several additional 
proposals and urging them upon the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules. In addition, discovery-related research has been 
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center: the Office for Im- 
provements in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ) of the De- 
partment of Justice,' and the National commission for the Re- 
2: Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). 
3. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979). 
4. 446 U.S. 997 (1980). 
5. Id. at 998, 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
6. Id. at 1000-01. 
7 .  See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE 
CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY (Federal Judicial Center 1978). 
8. See C. Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse (May 11, 1979) (re- 
port submitted to the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, United 
States Department of Justice). 
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view of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.@ In late 1978 Judge 
Mary M. Schroeder and John P. Frank, with support from 
OIAJ, organized a conference of about twenty discovery special- 
ists at the Arizona State University Law School. The meeting 
resulted in an influential report arguing against the Special 
Committee's proposed limitations on the scope of discovery and 
the number of interrogatories.1° A follow-up conference, under 
OIAJ auspices, was held at the Department of Justice in August 
1980 with a similar group of conferees. At the two meetings 
there was a rough but clear consensus that the time had arrived 
for a significant reevaluation of the entire process of pretrial dis- 
covery. There was a widespread sense of uneasiness about the 
system as it presently functions. 
Underlying the disquiet about federal discovery practice are 
growing doubts about two basic premises of the pretrial discov- 
ery system adopted for the federal courts in 1938. One chal- 
lenged premise is that in the discovery practice "more is better.'' 
This theme was written into the rules in 1938 and in 1947 re- 
ceived a vigorous endorsement from the Supreme Court in its 
celebrated decision in Hickman u. Taylor:ll 
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by 
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either 
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has 
in his possession.12 
The second premise that has come under increasing attack 
is that discovery does not need judicial attention because law- 
yers will practice it under a rule of reason reinforced by mutual 
self-interest in avoiding the waste of their time or their clients' 
money which results when unnecessary pursuit or resistance in 
the discovery process occurs. This view holds that discovery 
practice should be a self-regulating affair with judges remaining 
aloof and uninvolved except in those rare situations that lawyers 
find themselves unable to resolve on their own. 
Even though the widespread cries of "discovery abuse" are 
not explicitly phrased as challenges to the "more is better" and 
9. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, RE- 
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979). 
10. REPORT OF ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY DISCOVERY CONFERENCE ONTHE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE'S PROPOSED REVISION OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY) (Nov. 
1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ARIZ. DISCOVERY CONF.]; See 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 494. 
11. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
12. Id. at 507. 
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"judges not needed" premises of federal discovery practice, that 
is what they seem to be. The implication of the federal rules and 
court decisions, that the more discovery the better, is fortified 
by the provision in Rule 26(a) that "the frequency of use of 
these methods is not limited" unless the court finds reason to 
restrict it by issuing a protective order under Rule 26(c) "for 
good cause shown." The causes warranting issuance of protective 
orders do not include the repetitiveness, redundancy, or nonne- 
cessity of discovery of the type or from the source in question. 
Nor do they include any indication that the court should confine 
discovery to an amount proportionate to the issues or values at 
stake in the litigation. A reaction against the wide-open repeti- 
tive kind of excesses in discovery practice may be one reason for 
the hue and cry about "abuse." 
The other premise of the rule-that discovery could be reg- 
ulated by the lawyers themselves-was formulated without tak- 
ing into account the steady change in the last generation in the 
method employed by lawyers to fix their fees. This change has 
been characterized by a movement toward the practice of billing 
by the hour or fraction." In a period of rising afauence and ram- 
pant litigiousness, lawyers have experienced a pleasing conver- 
gence of two strong motivations: their professional urge to leave 
no stone unturned in preparing the case through pretrial discov- 
ery, and their economic interest in increasing the number of bill- 
able hours they devote to the case. A "discovery industry" has 
arisen-a vocation that appears to be self-justifying if not self- 
regulating. That is, in cases that can tolerate it, discovery is an 
end in itself, without much reference to whether the incremental 
value of discovered materials is a t  least equal to the cost in en- 
ergy and fees of getting them." 
This Article reviews the discovery rule changes proposed by 
the ABA's Special Committee and others, evaluates the propos- 
als in light of available research and the opposition that has 
been raised to them, and examines alternatives that we believe 
are more responsive to the fundamental problems of discovery. 
In short, we confront directly the theories that "more is better" 
13. See, e.g., Darby, It's About Time: A Survey of Lawyers' Timekeeping Practices, 
4 LEGAL ECON. 39 (1978); Laumann & Heinz, The Organization of Lawyers' Work: Size, 
Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 
217. 
14. See Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 
48 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (1980). 
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and that "judges are not needed" because discovery should be 
regulated by the lawyers themselves. 
A. The 1977 Proposals: Limiting the Scope of Discovery and 
the Number of Interrogatories 
In 1977 the Special Committee issued a report that recom- 
mended amendments to a number of Federal Rules of Civil Pro- 
cedure, including several of the rules governing pretrial discov- 
ery." Appropriate committees of the Judicial Conference 
considered the report, solicited comment, conducted public 
hearings, and eventually recommended a set of amendments 
which, on April 29, 1980, were promulgated by the Supreme 
Court and, encountering no opposition from Congress, became 
effective August 1, 1980.16 Measured against the amendments 
that actually went into effect, the Special Committee's discovery 
proposals acheived mixed success. 
Two of the most significant and controversial proposals 
made by the Special Committee, but not adopted by the Judicial 
Conference, were (1) a revision of the scope of discovery permit- 
ted by Rule 26(b) (the phrase "relevant to the subject matter" of 
the action would become "relevant to the issues raised by the 
claims or defenses of any party") and (2) a revision limiting to 
thirty the number of interrogatories that could be served with- 
out court approval. Both proposals met with strong opposition 
from the bench and bar. 
The objections to the scope-narrowing proposal were sum- 
marized by Judge Mary M. Schroeder and John P. Frank," who 
argued that it would likely wipe out notice pleading," would be 
ineffective in the face of the rule permitting liberal amendments 
to pleadings,lS and would prompt a new round of litigation as to 
the meaning of the terms employed in the proposed amend- 
ment.'O On the basis of a review of reported cases and a number 
15. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY 
OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977). 
16. 446 U.S. 997 (1980). 
17. Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 475. 
18. Id. at 486. See also Becker, Modern Discouery: Promoting Efficient Use and 
Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978). 
19. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 17, at 481-90. 
20. Id. at 480-81. 
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of interviews with attorneys, they concluded that the scope-nar- 
rowing proposals would reduce discovery in very few, if any, 
The Special Committee had generally conceded drawbacks 
in its proposal but insisted the changes were necessary to send a 
message to the courts not to err "on the side of expansive dis- 
c ~ v e r y . " ~ ~  Schroeder and Frank did not question the need for 
sending a message; they simply concluded that the proposal 
would deliver the wrong message to the wrong place.2s 
Schroeder and Frank also summarized objections to the pro- 
posal to limit the numbers of interrogatories a party may serve 
without court approval, making the point that fixed and arbi- 
trary limits are often inappropriate because cases vary widely in 
their needs." Fifty interrogatories may be excessive in some 
cases and wholly insufficient in others. Further, they feared that 
courts may be called upon to squander time and energy consid- 
ering applications to enlarge the number of interrogatories that 
can be served and determining whether a particular question 
constitutes a single interrogatory or more than one? 
Opposition to this proposal has also been based on the argu- 
ment that excessive interrogatories are only part of the problem: 
for example, unnecessarily lengthy and numerous depositions 
can be as objectionable as interrogatories and are often more ex- 
pensive to the par tie^.'^ In addition it has been argued that any 
limitation on the number of interrogatories that can be served 
without court supervision may unfairly discriminate against liti- 
gants with modest means who often rely upon interrogatories as 
their principal or sole means of obtaining dis~overy?~ 
B. The 1980 Proposals: Assuring Stricter Compliance 
In early 1980 the Special Committee issued a second set of 
proposals to amend the discovery rules." Included were the ma- 
jor ones earlier rejected by the Advisory Committee-the scope- 
21. Id. at 479-80. 
22. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 15, at 3. 
23. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 17, at 480. 
24. Id. at 487. 
25. Id. 
26. Minutes of Conference on Improving Pretrial Discovery 2 (August 28, 1980). 
27. Id. 
28. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECOND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE 
STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT NO. 21. 
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narrowing proposal and the limitation on the number of inter- 
rogatories that may be served without court approval. In addi- 
tion, the Special Committee proposed a new subsection designed 
to induce stricter compliance with specific limitations and gener- 
ally to curb disproportionate pushing, tripping or overdoing in 
discovery practi~e.'~ 
The approach in the new subsection was patterned after 
Rule 11, which provides that an attorney's signature on a plead- 
ing constitutes a certificate that the pleading is well founded and 
bona fide. Specifically, the Special Committee's proposal is that 
in submitting a discovery request, objection, motion or opposi- 
tion, the attorney's signature should constitute 
a certificate by him that he has read the request, objection, 
motion or opposition; that to the best of his knowledge and 
belief the request, objection, motion or opposition is made in 
good faith and is not unreasonably annoying, embarrassing or 
oppressive or unduly burdensome or unduly expensive [given 
the nature and complexity of the case, the amount in contro- 
versy or other values at  stake in the litigation, and the discov- 
ery, if any, which has already been had;] and is not interposed 
for delay.s0 
The italicized words track the language in present Rule 26(c), 
prescribing the grounds for issuance of a protective order, but 
add the modifier "unreasonably." The bracketed material is new 
and enlarges existing  obligation^.^^ Many courts would not, 
under current practice, issue protective orders in the circum- 
stances covered by the new Ianguage." In introducing the con- 
cept of proportionality and calling attention to discovery already 
had, the proposal undercuts the "more is better" theme and the 
"frequency . . . is not limited"ss directive. 
29. Id. at 11. 
30. Id. (emphasis and brackets added). 
31. The language following the bracketed material is borrowed from present Rule 
11. 
32. That is not universally so, however. A few courts have held that discovery that is 
disproportionate, cumulative, duplicative, available from another source, or obtainable 
by some other discovery device can be limited by the issuance of a protective order. See 
Walker v. United Parcel Sews., 87 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiff denied opportu- 
nity to depose a witness on grounds that deposition would be largely duplicative); I n  re 
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 1975) ("interroga- 
tories must be tailored to discover only what is reasonable and necessary to the litigation 
a t  hand"); Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969) (two hundred interrogatories 
found to be oppressive in case involving ordinary rear-end collision). 
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
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A. The Special Committee's View of the Problem 
We submit that the Special Committee's effort to curb 
"overdiscovery" by narrowing the breadth of discovery mis- 
perceives the problem in its most usual form. It is probably true 
that some discovery may seem excessive to a responding party or 
to a court because it appears to reach beyond the issues, subject 
matter, or claims and defenses fairly raised or presented in the 
case as made by the pleadings?' But it is also true that very 
often when discovery is viewed as excessive by responding par- 
ties and courts it is so regarded not because it is irrelevant to 
issues in the case but because, even though relevant, it is dupli- 
cative, redundant, or simply disproportionately costly in relation 
to the values at stake in the l i t iga t i~n.~~ In short, much of the 
truly abusive discovery that occurs is discovery that is too deep 
rather than too broad. 
If that point is sound, discovery improvement efforts should 
be directed not toward narrowing the definition of what is rele- 
vant, but rather toward protecting responding parties from re- 
dundant, duplicative and "disproportionate" discovery by reduc- 
ing the number of inquiries that may be made concerning 
matters otherwise properly subject to discovery. 
Such a reduction might be accomplished through more fre- 
quent use of protective orders under Rule 26(c)? As presently 
cast, Rule 26(c) permits a judge to "make any order which jus- 
tice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, em- 
barrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."" 
Surveys of reported casess8 and available empirical evidencess 
34. On the other hand, Schroeder and Frank maintain that such instances are ex- 
tremely rare. Supra note 17, at 479-80. 
35. Note 26 supra. 
36. This suggestion was originally made in a working paper prepared for the Nov- 
ember, 1978, Arizona State Conference. REPORT ARIZ. DISCOVERY CONF., supra note 10, at 
3 n.1. 
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
38. Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Dykes v. Mor- 
ris, 85 F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 
1979); United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kiblen v. Retail 
Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977); Alexander v. Parsons, 75 F.R.D. 536 (W.D. 
Mich. 1977); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 
Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Wirtz v. Capitol Air 
Serv., Inc., 42 F.R.D. 641 (D. Kan. 1967); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 33 F.R.D. 
283 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 
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disclose that trial courts are reluctant to restrict discovery on 
these grounds unless the moving party makes a strong showing 
of an enumerated kind of injury. Under prevailing law, if the 
objection to discovery is that it is disproportionate to the needs 
of the case, cumulative, duplicative or more readily available 
from another source, and no showing of extreme burden or hard- 
ship is made, courts are unlikely to issue protective orders. This 
is in line with the traditional "more is better" attitude that rests 
upon the Hickman canon that "[m]utual knowledge of all rele- 
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation. "'O 
, B. Determining Whether Discovery is Excessive 
The acceptance of the traditional "more is better" attitude 
raises a number of questions with respect to what ought to be 
permitted in the discovery process: 
1. Should a party who has essentially completed discovery 
in a particular area be permitted to subject an adversary to ad- 
ditional discovery requests related to the same general subject?" 
2. Should a party be required to respond to an adversary's 
lengthy interrogatories shortly before the party is to be deposed 
by the adversary? Could not the same question be asked during 
the deposition, eliminating redundancy for both parties?*% In 
some circumstances should discovery by interrogatories be re- 
quired as more efficacious than depositions? 
3. Should a party be required to respond to a discovery re- 
1961); B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 
1959); Hornung v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 11 F.R.D. 300 (N.D. Ohio 1951). 
39. The Federal Judicial Center has found: 
[Tlhere is support for the view that judges generally accord great deference to 
the liberality of the discovery rules. Though rulings on protecting motions tend 
to favor the moving party, the tendency is not nearly so strong as that in rul- 
ings on compelling motions directed to substance. Judges . . . overwhelmingly 
permit requesting parties to compel discovery, but are far less likely to permit 
requesting parties to block discovery. 
P. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 107 (footnote omitted). 
40. 329 U.S. at 507. 
41. In Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court would not per- 
mit additional discovery. The court emphasized that it had a special duty to restrict 
discovery of this character because the case was of a complex nature. It is not clear how 
the court would have ruled if the case had not been a complex one or if the stakes in- 
volved had been substantially less. 
42. See Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704 (D.V.I. 1975); Boyden 
v. Troken, 60 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
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quest when it can be established that the requester has already 
received the information in another manner or from a different 
source, or that the information is more readily available from 
another source?4s 
4. Could discovery be limited without unduly prejudicing 
the rights of parties when the material sought to be discovered 
can be readily obtained by another, less burdensome method?" 
5. Should a party be required to respond to interrogatories 
when that party has been previously deposed on the same area 
covered in the interrogat~ry?'~ 
Although none of these questions can be answered easily 
and categorically in the abstract, the reduction of unnecessary 
duplication and repetition is certainly a worthwhile It 
might seem that under the current rule courts are authorized to 
issue protective orders to achieve that goal in the circumstances 
described in the five questions posed above. In practice this gen- 
erally does not happen. Usually courts have been reluctant to 
issue protective orders except in the most compelling 
 circumstance^.^" 
IV. A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE DEPTH OF DISCOVERY 
To effect the change in practice needed to reduce unneces- 
sary duplication and repetition in discovery, Rule 26(c) should 
be amended to specify that protection is to be afforded not only 
against discovery that causes "unreasonable annoyance, embar- 
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," but also 
against discovery that is duplicative and cumulative or out of 
proportion to the needs of the particular case. By broadening 
the grounds for the issuance of such orders, and by emphasizing 
the need for reducing duplication and repetition, Rule 26(c) 
might encourage trial judges to be more diligent in preventing 
needless discovery. 
43. See Lenard v. Greenville Mun. Separate School Dist., 75 F.R.D. 448 (N.D. Miss. 
1977); Apco Oil Corp. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969); United 
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 252 (D.N.J. 1960). 
44. For example, a party to whom interrogatories are addressed may be willing to 
stipulate or admit the relevant underlying facts. Compare Quaker Chair Corp. v. Litton 
Business Sys., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) with Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. 
Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975). 
45. This issue can arise when counsel, due to oversight, negligence, or incompetence, 
has failed to make the appropriate inquiries during a deposition and then seeks to cover 
the omissions by interrogatories. 
46. See note 38 supra. 
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The likely result of the adoption of this proposal would be 
greater judicial involvement in the discovery process-an in- 
fringement of a general premise of the federal rules as originally 
drawn and of the specific intention of the 1970 amendments that 
discovery should operate outside the court and be self-regulat- 
ing. That hope simply has not been realized due to a variety of 
factors: the desire of lawyers (and parties) for delay; lawyer bill- 
ing practices which create incentives to enlarge rather than min- 
imize time spent; the widespread notion that discovery is an end 
in itself rather than a means of facilitating judgment:? the nor- 
mal effects of human inertia abetted by absence of deadlines or 
authoritative prodding; and the conflict' between the adversarial 
system on one hand and a process that depends upon coopera- 
tion for its success on the other.48 As a result, the current trend 
of thinking is that greater judicial involvement, not less, is es- 
sential to reduce problems of discovery abuse. Professor Wayne 
D. Brazil, in a recent report on the discovery practice of the Chi- 
cago Bar, concluded: "The generalization that emerges from the 
numerous vocal complaints about judicial attitudes is that to a 
great many attorneys judges appear to believe that discovery 
disputes simply do not belong in the courtrooms. Many lawyers 
deeply resent this attit~de.'"~ This view paralleled the finding of 
the Federal Judicial Center in its 1978 report on discovery prac- 
tices that effective control of discovery depends upon judicial 
management.60 
47. In a recent article, Martin Kiminsky noted: 
The discovery process has become, for both sides, a litigation weapon to  dis- 
courage and prevent prosecution of claims, to force a settlement or merely to 
wear down an adversary. Counsel, regrettably, often look upon discovery as a 
meal ticket or annuity rather than as a quick and inexpensive quest for evi- 
dence. These were obviously not the intentions of the draftsmen of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and should not be permitted to thwart the right of 
litigants to their day in court. 
Kaminsky, supra note 14, at 922 (1980) (footnotes omitted). See also Pollack, Discov- 
ery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978). In his concurring opinion in Her- 
bert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979), Justice Powell wrote that "discovery techniques 
and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art-one not infrequently ex- 
ploited to the disadvantage of justice.':< 
48. See Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers 
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDAT~ON RESEARCH J. 219. 
49. Id. a t  246. 
50. P. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, a t  77. 
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A. Amending Rule 26(c) to Consider Proportionality 
If greater court involvement is necessarily the wave of the 
future, one method of accomplishing it is to strengthen the hand 
of the trial judges to control discovery by broadening their 
power to issue protective orders. Such a proposal was recom- 
mended by the Arizona State conferhce" but was never acted 
upon by the Judicial Conference. A redraft of Rule 26(c) incor- 
porating the principle is provided in Appendix I. 
This amendment would authorize trial judges to exercise 
control by ensuring that the discovery sought is not out of pro- 
portion to the needs of the case. Taking into account factors of 
redundancy and proportionality, a court could limit the number 
of depositions or interrogatories, or impose whatever other limits 
it concluded were necessary, to confine discovery efforts to those 
reasonably calculated to yield benefits that are worth the costs. 
This approach, geared to the circumstances of the case, is more 
promising than one that sets arbitrary numerical limits or that 
assumes that fluid concepts such as "relevant to the issues raised 
by the claims or defenses" can provide clear boundaries or send 
intelligible messages to the bench and bar. 
B. Amending Rule 26(a) to Encourage Discovery Limitations 
If Rule 26(c) is amended as proposed, the courts will clearly 
possess the power to curb excessive discovery and will be en- 
couraged to do so. The message will be: Discovery is useful, but 
it must not be used to the point of abuse. To avoid diluting the 
message by flashing a contradictory signal, Rule 26(a) should be 
amended to drop the statement that "the frequency of use of 
[discovery] methods is not limited." 
The first of two possible amendments to subsection (a) 
would directly parallel the provisions of proposed Rule 26(c) by 
providing that discovery be limited to that which is "commensu- 
rate in cost and duration with the needs of the case, the re- 
sources reasonably expected to be available to the parties or per- 
sons involved and the substantiality of the issues."52 This 
51. REPORT ARIZ. DISCOVERY CONF., supra note 10, at 9; Schroeder & Frank, supra 
note 17, at 498. 
52. See Appendix I. This provision would allow the court to take into account the 
need of parties with limited resources to opt for less expensive discovery methods. Such 
a party might, for example, be permitted to file more interrogatories than ordinarily nec- 
essary because of insufficient resources to develop the case by more expensive discovery 
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approach would make it unmistakably clear that too much dis- 
covery, even on relevant subjects, is not acceptable. This formu- 
lation would convey a realization that there are times when dis- 
covery must be limited even if the effect may be to preclude 
uncovering evidence or leads to evidence that might conceivably 
aid the presentation of the case. Not every incremental bit of 
information is worth the trouble and expense of obtaining it. 
The discovering side will insist it is, but, in a proper case, the 
other side is entitled to a determination that it is not worth the 
trouble. 
The second possible amendment would be a simple provi- 
sion in Rule 26(a) allowing the court to limit the frequency of 
discovery pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(c)." 
Adoption of these proposals would harmonize the sections 
of Rule 26 that set explicit limits on discovery (subsections (a) 
and (b)) with the provisions that empower the courts to issue 
protective orders to ensure that discovery is properly confined 
(subsection (c)). These amendments would also aid the trial 
court in the exercise of its recently enacted authority to set 
"limitations on discovery" under the discovery conference provi- 
sions of new Rule 26(f). 
C. Eliminating the Need for Additional Attorney 
Certification 
If the proposed amendments to Rule 26(a) and (c) are 
adopted, the Special Committee's attorney certification proposal 
may be unnecessary. Disproportionate, cumulative, and duplica- 
tive discovery will be curbed or controllable pursuant to Rules 
26(a) and (c). The sanctions provided in Rules 26 and 37 should 
be adequate to deal with any discovery activities that go beyond 
those barriers. 
A case can be made for including a certification requirement 
in the rules to serve as an early warning that the purpose of the 
discovery process is to gain information-not to cause delay, in- 
crease expense, wear down opponents, force settlement, or dis- 
courage meritorious claims or defenses-and that discovery 
devices such as depositions. In addition, this provision would allow the court to curtail 
discovery in circumstances where it is appparent that a party with significant resources 
is using the discovery process to wear down a financially weaker adversary, either to 
discourage meritorious claims or defenses or to force unwanted settlements. See Kamin- 
sky, supra note 14, at 922. 
53. See Appendix 11. 
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must not be pushed to excess. If this case persuades the 
rulemakers, a certification provision, using essentially the same 
language as that contained in the proposed amendment to Rule 
26(c), could be adopted to serve that purpose. 
In its latest proposal the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
has chosen a different method to combat disproportionate and 
repetitive discovery-viz., by inserting in Rule 26(b) a new para- 
graph that spells out excess-avoiding limits on otherwise permis- 
sible dis~overy.~ We strongly endorse that approach, which was 
one of the options we recommended to the Advisory Committee 
in an earlier draft of this paper. 
There has been widespread criticism in recent years of the 
undue expense and burden of the civil discovery process. It is 
argued that discovery has gotten out of hand because two funda- 
mental and long-standing premises of the civil litigation process 
have not been subjected to sufticiently critical scrutiny in light 
of present circumstances. One premise, which was elevated to 
high principle in Hickman v. Taylor,ss holds that a party is enti- 
tled to know everything there is to know about the opposition's 
case. The second premise is that court involvement in the dis- 
covery process should be exceptional; the norm was to be law- 
yer-regulation, with self-interest assuring good behavior. In an 
earlier day when cases were fewer, litigation less complex, and 
attorney motivations perhaps different, these premises may have 
been sound. We submit that they are no longer reliable premises 
and that this new reality must be faced squarely in amending 
the rules. 
The proposals advanced here attempt to do this. They 
would restrain discovery not solely on the basis of relevancy, 
privilege, or whether the discovery sought would be annoying, 
embarrassing, oppressive, unduly burdensome, or unduly expen- 
sive, but also on the basis of whether the discovery requested 
avoids excesses of redundancy and disproportionality. Guides to 
these concepts would be provided in the rules and would be ap- 
plied in light of the circumstances of the case. Necessarily, our 
54. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 479 (1981). 
55. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
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proposals contemplate a greater involvement of judges in the 
discovery process in an effort to assure that permitted discovery 
will not be carried to excess. 
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Proposed Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) 
(c) Protective Orders and Other Limits on Discovery. The 
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the depo- 
sition is to be taken may sua sponte; upon motion by a party or 
by the person from whom discovery is sought, and upon good 
cause shown; or in conjunction with any conference conducted 
pursuant to these rules make an order which justice requires if 
the court finds it necessary to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex- 
pense or if the court finds that the discovery sought is cumula- 
tive or duplicative; obtainable from some other source which is 
either more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; or, 
that the party seeking discovery has previously had ample op- 
portunity to obtain the information sought. I n  entering a pro- 
tective order pursuant to this subsection, the court shall ensure 
that the discovery allowed is commensurate in cost and dura- 
tion with the needs of the case, the resources reasonably ex- 
pected to be available to the parties or persons involved, and 
the substantiality of the issues. A protective order issued pur- 
suant to this subsection should include one or more of the fol- 
lowing: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a 
designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be 
had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by 
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be in- 
quired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to cer- 
tain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one pre- 
sent except persons designated by the court; (6) that a 
deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, de- 
velopment, or commercial information not be disclosed or be 
disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed 
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in 
part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, 
order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses in- 
curred in relation to the motion. 
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Proposed amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) 
(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by 
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral 
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; pro- 
duction of documents or things or permission to enter upon 
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
[Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this 
rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited]. 
The bracketed material would be deleted and the following 
provision substituted: 
The frequency of use of these methods may be limited by 
the court, incident to any conference conducted in accordance 
with these rules, on motion for a protective order pursuant to 
Rule 26(c), or on its own initiative to ensure that the discovery 
sought is commensurate in cost, duration, and frequency with 
the needs of the case, the resources reasonably expected to be 
available to the parties or persons involved and the substanti- 
ality of the issues. 
As an alternative, the bracketed material should be deleted 
and the following substituted: "The frequency of use of these 
methods may be limited by the court pursuant to subsection (c) 
of this rule." 
